Political Islam’s
relation to Capital and Class
Ardeshir Mehrdad and Yassamine
Mather
The last three decades have
witnessed a relentless growth of Islamic movements, so that, today
political
Islam is an undeniable reality on the world scene. The events of
In many countries, the movements of
political Islam raise their flag as that of ‘seekers of justice’ and
aim their
propaganda at the poorest and most deprived sections of society. They,
thereby,
present themselves as a rival to the forces of socialism and the left.
The
formulation of a strategy to respond to this challenge requires a
deeper
understanding of the background to, and reasons for, these
developments. This
article presents some preliminary theses, based on a necessarily
limited and
general outline of the characteristics and peculiarities of the Islamic
movements.
Amidst the ravages of the wars in
What, then, is the basis of the
political economy of Islamic fundamentalism? How does it gain its
supporters
amongst the poor and the ‘dispossessed’? What is the relation between
the
promises of equality in the rule of sharia’a and the real politics of Islamic
governance within the world capitalist order?
From the 1970s onwards, as Islamic societies of the
periphery were
incorporated ever-deeper into the world market, the centre-periphery
crisis in
these societies entered a new and qualitatively different phase. The
fluctuating, but, overall, downward trend in the price of raw
materials,
including - for most of the period - oil, on which these societies depend,
speeded up the widening of inequality in social,
economic and cultural development; the accumulation
of foreign debt; and the increasing inability of such states to
control and restrain the
spiralling crises they have to confront.
A modern phenomenon
The ‘revolutionary Islamic movement’
is a contemporary phenomenon. Whatever may be the indirect or minor
influences
of past Islamic movements on it, it is attached by an umbilical cord to
the form of world
capitalism that has
developed in the last three decades. The social roots of the ‘political
Islamic
movements’ are,
essentially,
the uprooted – those
who, for a
variety of reasons, have been waylaid on the path of
socio-economic development; and, to whom the new structures have
brought
nothing but bankruptcies and ruin. Despite variations in its social
fabric in
different circumstances, the pan-Islamist movement in all the
more-or-less
developed countries of the periphery (with a few exceptions) has
recruited
among four main layers.
First are the urban uprooted and
deprived. They belong to the explosion of people with no stable
relation to the expanding peripheral-capitalist system of production
and
distribution. These apparently ‘cursed’ people have in common a peasant
ancestry, taking ‘refuge’ in the dirt and mud surrounding such cities
as
Second are middle layers belonging
to pre-capitalist structures.
Such people have been
bankrupted or marginalised by the spread of capitalist
structures and their fate is to struggle harder only to sink into
greater poverty.
They are important
in helping to organise the Islamic movements, and in welding
together their socially
disparate supporters.
The third layer comprises sections
of the merchant and industrial bourgeoisie left outside the circle of
power. They
find themselves in unequal competition with a bourgeoisie
privileged by being close to (and reliant on) a state, the rationale of
which
has been to orchestrate development from above. In peripheral societies
where
the bourgeois state (rather than being the product of capitalist
development)
imposes the growth of capitalism from above - and where the relation between
power and capital is turned upside down to the extent that it is easier
to rely
on power to make money than on wealth as a gateway to power - those layers of the bourgeoisie
excluded from power can count on being permanent losers. This fate
places
manufacturers and merchants in the same camp as the ‘wretched of the
earth.’
Such people not only fill the coffers of the Islamic movement, but can
also, for
a period, help to increase the attraction of pan-Islamism to the
justice-seeking
poor by setting up charities,
interest-free loan accounts and other such schemes.
Fourth are intellectuals
whose social standing has
declined, who have lost out, altogether or at least to some
degree, during
the formation of the new
political and civil structures. These intellectuals find their influence and
privileges vanishing. They are increasingly isolated. Whether or not in
priestly clothes, whether
young or old, whether or not -
objectively - their re-emergence would answer a
structural need, they will use the religious movement to re-establish their place in
society. They provide the leadership cadres of the movement, those who
pack the
ideological baggage and map the political strategy for the ‘Islamic
movement.’
Anti-enlightenment
The pan-Islamist movement, in its
rebellion against the hopelessness capitalism has engendered, rests on
the
rejection of enlightenment. The ideologists of this rebellion have to
close
their eyes to the future, turn their backs on reality and take refuge
in myths.
This obscurantism, ironically, brings today’s uprooted poor together,
under one
umbrella, with yesterday’s rich. It is an Islam based on resurrecting,
from a
vast store of stories and myths, ideas that promise the end of misery
for all
those on the scrapheap. It insists there is no alternative to a
movement that
is foreign to common sense and free thought in all its forms. It treats
as
enemies all who favour scientific thought and who question the
so-called
‘certainties’ (tashkik). In this view any attempt at
enlightenment, whether of yesterday or today, is a devilish plot to be
fought
at all costs.
Against class-based line-ups
The pan-Islamist movement is a
furnace in which class line-ups must melt. The non-homogeneous
(multi-class)
mix in the Islamists’ camp dictates a policy of denying class war, or at least
marginalising it and removing it from the immediate agenda.
Such a non-class-based social bloc, based on religious cultural unity,
has no
other way of surmounting the class antagonisms within it between the
hungry and
those with full bellies. Here and there, ‘the war between poverty and
wealth’
becomes a weapon for the movement to browbeat its merchant
fellow-travellers
when they become restless, or to loosen their purse strings. But in
general,
sharia’a remains firmly on the side of ‘unity’ and those who ‘split’
(monafegh)
are worse than those who do not ‘believe’ (moshrek). It has an
uncompromising
enmity towards communism or any other political creed which defines
society by
its class boundaries and perceives class confrontations as inevitable.
No national boundaries
At every level the new ‘Islamic
movement’ is the rising of those who not only see themselves as
alienated within
their own national boundaries, but also of those who have (they think)
discovered the source of their destitution and bankruptcy outside these
boundaries. From their beginnings, therefore, these movements face
outwards.
The foreign enemy is seen as the root cause of all evil; in creating
the
mechanisms of depravity and misery, it ensures that all Muslims suffer injustice
equally.
‘Political Islam’, accordingly,
cannot confine itself within national boundaries. To aspire to set up
anything
less than a world Islamic power, based on a world Islamic will, would be to acknowledge
ultimate defeat. This is the logic behind the
rejection of the legitimacy of all the civil and secular systems that sustain nation states, and of all international
treaties
and agreements between nation states. It is the context that explains
the
inherent contradiction involved in simultaneously opposing both
imperialism and
world ‘arrogance’, and also nationalism. The Islamic movement may here
and
there support tendencies aiming at independence and even isolationism.
Yet it
is emphatic in its rejection of nationalisms that counterpose the
nation
against the umma (Islamic community).
Anti-democratic
The pan-Islamist movement - however its elements interpret
‘political Islam’ -
opposes democracy in all its forms. The movement’s beliefs, class
make-up and
historic direction come together to reject popular sovereignty and the
right of
the people to determine their own destiny by majority vote. It is
forced to
locate the right of sovereignty above the heads of ordinary people, to
make it
the overarching authority that must resolve the movement’s internal and
external contradictions. Divine rule, where all rights belong to god,
is the
only realm where there are no tensions and dissent. And it is only the
divine
that can give away this or that right on earth to the chosen people - whether the Islamists in question
wear clerical or civilian apparel.
Who is invested with this
divine gift? This is a matter the ‘chosen’ must settle amongst themselves.
The right of people to vote on a one-person-one-vote basis can, at best, only be accepted once. This is in regard to
the initial decision – for or against the
Islamic Republic. Thereafter, the only political
function of the people is to express their allegiance
(beia’a) to the chosen (nokhbegan).
Democracy is an institutional
mechanism to establish a legal basis for government. Islam, however,
recognises
only particular personages - a
governor, vali or caliph: it does not
recognize institutions of government. Yet, in practice, it must
institutionalise
the right to make decisions by a small coterie of nokhbegan and
religious
authorities (mujtahed) -
i.e. those who have the ability and
‘knowledge’ to interpret divine law for any given circumstance.
Recognition of
those who have this ability is also in the hands of those who have
proven their
‘knowledge’ beforehand. Thus the question -“who decides?” - comes full circle.
Citizen
rights
Even outside the question of
political power and of government, the pan-Islamist movement cannot accept any rights for its
citizens. And, even if we put aside the fact
that Islamic sharia’a considers women as half a man (a destiny
considered
entirely compatible with ‘justice’), women will do little better in the
utopia
that the Islamic movement is advocating. The sanctity of the family is
basic to the reconstruction
of this ‘paradise
lost’, and the values cementing it together require an unambiguous
definition
of a woman – one that begins with her as a wife and ends
with her as a mother.
Outside the Islamic framework lies
the world of corruption. No matter how much political Islam shouts
about human
rights and the miracle of womanhood, it cannot acknowledge values which
cross
the boundary into this world. Sometimes this or that religion may be
favoured
for political purposes, so that its adherents may be afforded a status
equivalent to Muslims. But for the most part non-muslims are second-class citizens or worse.
Those who belong to proscribed religions, such
as the Baha'i, are directed to repent or die. If today religious
apartheid is
put on the shelf, tomorrow the conscience of a powerful and dominant
Islam will
not rest until the non-Muslims find their ‘rightful’ position. If
non-Muslims
are today exempt from paying the religious tax
(jezzieh), they will only have this added to future debts.
In sum, the sovereignty of the
people is a concept alien to the pan-Islamism movement, which, most
ominously,
will actively seek to destroy it altogether.
Jihad and terrorism
The pan-Islamism movement is a
‘Jihad.’ The uprooted who decide that a ‘wheel that does not turn for
their
needs should never turn’, and who do not see any reason to decry the
ruination
of today if it leads to the utopia of tomorrow, can have no
other recourse but to the sword. No open and free environment, no
democratic
system, no legal testament can guarantee their goal. Even if
pan-Islamism can,
in some circumstances, gain power through legal means; whether or not it is suppressed
or allowed to grow; whatever
its place in a particular balance of power: it has in
general entered an arena of war where pulling the trigger is a daily
duty.
Recourse to terrorism in all its forms; the semi-military organisation
of that
part of the social base that can be mobilised; the creation of
professional
military institutions; attempts to infiltrate and recruit in the armies
of
Islamic countries: these are all acts which cannot be stopped or even
delayed.
Jihad is a road which will take pan-Islamism to the promised land.
The growing crisis and the steady
weakening of governments increased the intervention of global capital
in the
internal affairs of Islamic countries. This process reached a point at
which
the finance and economic ministries of many Islamic countries turned
into
impotent operatives for the decision-making centres
of
global capital. They bowed to major and crisis-provoking restructuring
of the
socio-political life of their countries. They presided over policies
that
caused massive unemployment and attendant despair; chronic inflation
ravaging
meagre savings; acute housing shortages leading to running battles
between the
guardians of the city and the never-ending waves of migrants; and
non-existent healthcare facilities that transform
hospitals effectively into morgues.
The savage demands of the
International Monetary Fund and the credit limitations imposed by the
World
Bank, forced peripheral governments to turn on their own people. What
little remained of state largesse, in the form of subsidies, dried up. Millions were made destitute,
unprotected against misery,
famine and disease. These were the people who carried Egyptian,
Tunisian,
Moroccan and
Algerian pan-Islamism on their
shoulders. The
scholars of Islam would do better - and would save their institutions
(official and unofficial) much money -
if, instead of looking for the
footprints of political Islam in history, they would wend their way to
the
archives of the IMF and its financial networks. There they would find the directives that cast light
on the cause of the plight of their people.
Crisis of political hegemony
The centre-periphery crisis of
capitalism is the prerequisite for unrest and mass uprisings in Islamic
societies. But that general crisis cannot of itself direct the revolt
organically in a particular way, whether towards pan-Islamism or, perhaps, progress and socialism. Without a particular
set of circumstances in the political and ideological sphere, and in the arena of
class conflict and social relations, pan-Islamism
would not have been able to grow into a broad mass movement. An
understanding
of the distinctive features of those circumstances involves analysis of
a
particular crisis of political hegemony within the framework of a
general
crisis of ideology. To begin from basics, this would necessitate a
rounded
discussion of the particular way politico-ideological structures in
peripheral
societies grow. This is beyond the scope of the argument here, but a
few
reminders may be useful.
First, although in the
majority of societies under
discussion the capitalist mode of production dominates, the bourgeoisie
has not
fully developed as the hegemonic class. The immaturity of the
bourgeoisie in
these social formations shows itself best in its anaemic political and
ideological personality. For this reason, the dominant ideology, the
prime
requirement of which is the securing of the voluntary assent of the
masses to
the existing social order, at best contains only elements of bourgeois
thinking. It is made up of an amalgam of nationalism, religious dogma,
elements
of petit-bourgeois ideas, paternalistic and tribal values, along with
some
aspects of liberalism.
Second, the acceleration
of structural changes very
quickly upsets the class-political line-ups and in uniquely new divisions
and allegiances. The ruling ideological
amalgam, discussed above, is not only incapable of fulfilling the task
of
gaining the assent of the masses, but also loses its effectiveness even
within the
ruling bloc. Not surprisingly, therefore,
any attempt to remodel and renew this doctrine has the effect of
reducing further its influence on one section of society just
as it appears to increase its capacity to influence other sectors. In
other
words, the more it becomes aware of the need to update its ideology,
the more
the bourgeosie both loses its ability to universalize its essential
ideology
and, paradoxically, provokes confrontations amongst the subordinate
ideological
trends.
Third, the end result of
such a process, especially if
it coincides with a major collapse of the government’s economic
programmes,
appears in the form of multi-dimensional changes in the various
political
structures. Inside the ruling bloc the crisis surfaces as one of hegemony, which
not only causes a series of changes in the balance of
power, but also often leads the purging of - or even a bloody suppression of - some of the ruling factions. This, in turn, reduces more than ever
the
hegemonic political influence of the ruling bloc on the masses,
diminishing its
social base even further.
But at the opposite pole, the working
class is powerless not only because of its
relative youth and political immaturity but also because it lacks an
effective
ideological base. The ‘Marxism-Leninism’ packaged in the ‘Academies of
Science’
of the ‘socialist bloc’, in conjunction with various theories of the
‘non-capitalist road to socialism’, in no way served to unite the
working
class. Quite the opposite. These theories rationalized the splitting of
the
political and trade-union movement into small groupings, and the
collapse of
other sections of workers into passivity or open surrender. In some
countries
the communist and worker parties went as far as liquidating themselves
and
amalgamating with the ruling party (e.g. in
To complete the picture, there was systematic police repression. Taken
together, all this explains why, at a time when conditions for the
growth of the class pole opposing the bourgeoisie were
at their best, the working
class remained weaker and more helpless than ever. This catastrophic
balance
between the two main class poles in society promoted not so much political paralysis as a vacuum – both of political
representation and of legitimacy. In such situations the voice from the minarets gains
an ear. A multicoloured amalgam of social layers is attracted by the
invitation
to a jihad, apparently taking its ideology from ancient tales and
sayings, but actually resurrected on the ruins, chaos and wretchedness
of today.
Facilitating
factors
We have argued, then that the
current conjuncture of political
and economic crises provides the necessary pre-conditions for the
mass pan-Islamist movement
in peripheral Islamic societies. But this is not the full explanation
for the
explosive growth of this phenomenon. To understand how pan-Islamism is
a
credible government-in-waiting in a number of counties, and indeed, has
taken
over power in some, we must consider a number of facilitating factors:
First is the presence of an official
religious establishment with a network of mosques and schools; an abundance of paid cadres; firm roots, to some extent
independent of state power;
the
ability to be in direct
daily contact with people; and finally certain legal and political
immunities, and numerous social and legal privileges. Whatever control
is
exerted on the official religious establishment, it remains the main
ideological arsenal and the durable political background of
pan-Islamism.
Second, we must consider the ruling
political administrations’ attitude to religion. In most Islamic
countries,
despite the gradual separation between the state and the religious
structures - and all the ups
and downs in the
relations between them -
some form of working alliance has always been
maintained. The prime purpose of this has been to oppose the left and
the
workers’ movement. At every juncture where the workers
and democratic movement have made advances, threatening the despotic
and
authoritarian systems, the religious apparatus has joined the army and
police
as an arm of repression. In return, from time to time, the state has
acted to
spread the network of religious schools and mosques; to facilitate the
establishment of workplace and neighbourhood Islamic societies; and to
promote
the religious establishment’s political influence by means of cultural,
devotional, and charitable organisations. Finally - in conditions of a single-party
state - there
has been toleration of the quasi-party activity of religious fractions
inside the
ruling party and government. Without a serious analysis of the role of the state in Islamic
countries, and without considering the relations between religion and
state, it
is impossible to understand how Islamic societies became so defenceless
in the
face of growing religious obscurantism and backward-looking political
movements.
The third factor is the effect of
imperialist policy during the Cold War. Throughout
it, one of the
major weapons of imperialist powers
against liberation movements (and movements for freedom and socialism)
in
Islamic countries was religion. In using religion
to
stupefy the masses and to denounce opposition, imperialism was
both resourceful and relentless. It used the religious weapon (through
groups, parties and men of influence) to provoke
splits
in the working-class movement, sabotage progressive and nationalist
movements,
and even to destabilise anti-imperialist governments or those allied
with
An incomplete list might include the
following. First, the assistance given to the rise of Ekhvane Muslemin
(Muslim
Brotherhood) against
The fourth point is the effect of
regional political crises on the overall growth of the pan-Islamist
movement.
The deadlock in Arab-Israeli relations
in general - embracing the questions of
A fifth facilitating factor was the Iranian revolution of 1979. The
coming to power of the first Islamic government to place pan-Islamism
at the
centre of its political and ideological agenda was crucial in the
spread of
‘political Islam.’ Nor could the Iranian government remain even
momentarily
content with exercising indirect influences on the Islamist movements.
From the
beginning it did whatever it could to influence them directly and take
over
their leadership. All the Islamic movements were supported financially,
logistically and by military training. Many groups and organisations
were
overhauled. Where necessary, the Iranian regime called on radical
factions
within Islamic organisations to split. It involved itself in an
extensive organisation
of terrorist and jihad-like cells, and embarked on an intensive drive
to shape
an Islamic international. Finally, it pursued an eight-year war with
The Islamic Republic of Iran is not
alone today in ‘exporting the pan-Islamist movement.’ Other states,
such as
Sixth, we must consider the effect of the collapse of the Soviet Union
and, especially, the coming of Bush’s ‘New World Order’, the
after-effects of which will, for the foreseeable future, feed blind
radicalism
and militant ‘anti-imperialist’
- the Islamists prefer the term
estekbar (loosely translated as ‘arrogance’) to
‘imperialism.’
In the conditions we have been outlining, legitimacy for pan-Islamist
and
similar movements comes when the prevailing gunboat diplomacy, and
outright
colonialist policies, of the
In devastating the kindergartens and hospitals
of
How is society affected?
The effect of all this is to grind
away at the potential for class action, for democratic movements, and for cultural
advance, as society becomes increasingly
polarized and, at the bottom, destitute - as it faces grave psycho-social problems. From
economy to politics, science and culture, wherever Pan-Islamism treads,
it
leaves a trail of conflict, contradiction and crisis. Its ruinous
effects on
secular life vary in extent and breadth at different stages of its
development,
and may at times even be self-negating, but there is a recognizable
pattern to
its development. We turn now to review this, first in conditions where
the
movement is in opposition, then when it gains political power.
Political
Islam in opposition
Political Islam splits civil society
at every level while leaving state structures intact.
In the first instance every type of
class organisation, institution, political party, trade union and guild
is
split in half along confrontational religious lines. Islamic labour and
peasant
unions and guilds stand opposed to their non-Islamic equivalents.
Nothing
escapes this split, not even bourgeois class organisations and
societies. Fissured
into Islamic and non-Islamic categories, the sub-groups glare at each
other
across an ideological divide that causes major transformation in the
social
class line-up. New -
fundamentally non-class -
blocs are formed. Labour-power lines up with
either ‘Islamic’ and ‘secular’ capital under the umbrellas of ‘Islam’
and
‘secularism.’ Meanwhile, in
society beyond the state, an embryonic form of
Bonapartism emerges, offering an alternative
future state formation. The potential for progressive class action is
systematically eroded.
Democratic erosion
Simultaneously democratic structures
and institutions are similarly split: the ideological weapon creates
Muslim
societies of doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, students, or women - distinct from non-Muslim groupings.
The Muslim doctors can no longer defend their
professional needs alongside non-Muslim doctors. Worse, their
duty to combat atheism and blasphemy overtakes every other duty.
Civil society is fractured into the
Islamic and non-Islamic: the divide rips apart everything from trade
unions to
professional organisations. This is the most profound and dangerous
consequence
of the pan-Islamic movement. It mobilises one section of society
against
another. This division even appears in some industries in core
capitalist
countries. The inevitable and tragic effect is to create artificial alliances throughout
society, on the basis of sex,
religion or ethnicity. Woman is set against woman, teacher against
teacher,
worker against worker.
Where Muslim women organise
separately from other women, not only do they enfeeble the women’s
movement in
its struggle for democratic rights, they even compromise its ability to
hang on
to past achievements. We see the tragic sight of a woman who has lost
all
rights voluntarily saying ‘yes’ to her
slavery. All this faces the democratic movement with its greatest
dilemma. As
its potential is eroded, a
territory is created
where the seeds of a future religious despotism are planted.
Paradoxically, the more
the masses occupy the stage the greater the power
of the leadership. Indeed there is an inverse relationship between
representation and mass mobilisation. The leadership of these movements
feed on
mass activity. Their power becomes more concentrated and unassailable
in direct
relation to their ability to bring the masses on to the political
scene. The
appearance of the masses, in these circumstances, signals not the
exercise of
their collective will but rather their political disrobement. Where the
masses
are reduced to the umma (family of believers) of the iman - where, in its ideal form, they are
the disciples of religious authorities (marja’a), then the more they
make their
presence felt in the political arena, the greater the authority of the
leaders,
imams and
clergy. The role of an individual with
his/her democratic rights in society, and the state, fades. The democratic base of society is weakened. The roots
of future
religious despotism are established and foundations of
an ultra-centralized, leader-focused political structure
are laid.
Cultural fatigue
In a society giving birth to a
radical Islamic movement, the cultural make-up is the first victim. The
cultural sphere disintegrates into numerous ever-smaller, conflicting formations,
united only by belief in the absolute. This
calamitous process effectively closes the route to cultural advance.
Scientific
thought, experimental sciences, philosophy, as well as values emanating
from
these, are
walled off by absolutist cultural
structures. The quest for the absolute - the struggle to annex knowledge to an
integrated and dominant ideological monopoly - becomes the governing, social
ethic.
In addition there is a return to the
most extreme paternalism, superstition and machismo, deepening the roots of the ideas that will
ultimately create, and
secure, the ultra-conservative, absolutist, and despotic structures of
the
Islamic state. In this process, not only is the value-system of society
overturned, but cultural, educational and ethical structures are
overhauled.
Muslim schools, Islamic social gatherings, and so on,
reappear. The intellectual potential of society is gradually eroded.
Thought,
in all its manifestations is enslaved to belief and Islamic ethics.
Sceptical
questioning -
essential to scientific and philosophical thought - is rejected as a tool of the devil.
Combine these pressures on independent thought with daily attacks on
modernism
and everything new, and the elements of a sterile and rigid
intellectual life
are all in place. Instead we have a situation in which intellectual
servitude,
demagoguery and obscurantism can breed; and in which religious
despotism can
grow.
Social psychology
More insidiously still, the
psychological potential of society becomes poisoned, and with
disastrous
effects. A corrosive mixture of absolutism and power-worship,
juxtaposed with the placing of a monopoly belief at the centre of
the social value-system of a polarized society leads to a cult of
violence. The ideological process numbs the senses, creating an acceptance of
a militaristic, police mentality. This can
be expressed as the
exhortation to the violence of the jihad (holy war); as the amre be ma’aruf (or duty to punish those who
do not observe Islamic laws); as the cult of martyrdom and the
‘blood’ (witness the fountain spewing blood in the ‘Martyrs’ Cemetery’ in Teheran); and
as the self-mutilation
associated with the mourning of saints and martyrs. All these, and
other
things, create an atmosphere where acts of violence and the shedding of
blood
become a social
norm.
It is in this context that the
deliberate burning of the
There are other negative outcomes. The situation increases
the power of the male, the khan, and the mullah; leads
to
unquestioning
acceptance of received wisdom; encourages crude populism; promotes the reduction of difficult concepts to
simple
absurdity; and creates fertile
ground for the rise in
religiosity and belief in the supernatural. Ultimately this leaves social
mistrust and creates the basis for future ideological and
police-military repressive institutions.
In power: the
political sphere
Once pan-Islamism creates a state in
which religion rules, its effect on the environment is
immeasurably greater and longer-lasting. Some of these effects will
undoubtedly
survive long after the Islamic regimes return to the grave from which
they
rose.
As we have seen the roots
of what becomes the Islamic State are established before political Islam
comes to power. Fundamental
changes in polarising society differently – in class
politics, in cultural and intellectual life, in social psychology and
in the
system of social ethics – have already taken place. Ideological
and political values that have
stubbornly
survived for centuries are now co-opted into service. What we now see
is, in effect, an overwhelming tendency towards the abolition of the
modern
state - to the
extent that its main indicator, its secular superstructure (the
separation of
politics and ideology, especially religious ideology) comes under
siege.
Sharia’a law displaces secular law.
A system of law based on the parliamentary vote, rationality and contemporary human needs
is replaced by one held to be
sacred and eternal. A process is unleashed to overturn the general
structures
of political power, giving the ideological institutions pivotal
positions in
the exercise of that power. The traditional role of the state is
overturned,
and it is transformed from the mechanism for the control of the
country’s
socio-economic tensions into the cause and perpetuator of those
tensions and
social crises. The contradiction between a religious-ideological state
and its
secular, material, rational base creates a situation of permanent
crisis. A
religious despotism is established in which the ruling
Islamic power creates a new legal system, where the right to govern at
every
level (legislative and judicial) is held to be divine - exercised solely on god’s behalf by certain sections of the clergy. The
modern capitalist
state’s formal equality of citizens before the law is abolished. It is
replaced
by a legal system where the ‘government of the ruling Ayatollahs’
stands above,
and in authority over, the masses.
In
power: the enlarged
and interventionist state structure
Three aspects of this greatly enlarged and more
interventionist state structure must be examined.
First, what in effect happens is that civil
society is more or less abolished. One
part of it is absorbed into the state itself, while the rest
disappears. Underlying this process is the denial of the independence
of the
private from the public sphere. Islamic government recognises no such
boundaries. No part of life is considered private and outside the
control of
divine rule, and that of god’s representatives. This totalising
conception
underlies the need to bring the very concept of civil society to an end. The sector reconstituted accepting
the ruling ideology is
organically incorporated into the state. The sectors that persist
in their
secular existence are annulled.
Civilians are mobilised in readily
available gangs to attack bookshops or dissident groups - the ‘mobilisation of the
dispossessed’ (basij mostaz’afin), involving millions. Islamic
societies are
set up and Islamic Shoras (committees) of – for example – workers, craftsmen, tradesmen, commercial
people, are created around
mosques, Hosseiniehs, the institutions of Friday Prayer, etc. All this allows
the Islamic state to spread its
tentacles into every home.
It is a rare trade organisation, cultural grouping or
political gathering that can escape this fate. The
paradox of complete absorption or total abolition is enacted with
increasing
determination and force, the deeper the ruling Islamic regime digs in.
Ultimately even those institutions to some extent
independent of parties, trade unions, etc., are abolished, or at least transformed
into appendages of the police-security
apparatus, or of the management of the office or enterprise. The
remnants of
civil society, in short, are militarised - or vaticanised -
playing their role for the state in
policing or ideological control.
This process encourages a ballooning
of bureaucracy; reduced productivity; obstructionism; the
multiplication of
centres of power and of parallel institutions; and corruption, bribery
and
nepotism.
While state bureaucracy is greatly expanded,
its power is paradoxically eroded. The greater the power of the state,
the more
‘private’ that state becomes. Not only is the modern state abolished,
the state
that replaces it becomes the representative not of the general
interests of
capital, but rather of the particular interests of specific capitals.
The second phenomenon consequent on the new
state structures is the depoliticisation
of the masses. Pan-Islamism in power politicises the whole of society
and
maintains it in a state of constant mobilisation. One section of
society imposes
state control, the other opposes by whatever means it can. Society is driven
in two opposing camps: the religious and the secular.
Paradoxically, however, this permanent politicisation tends to create
its own
opposite -
through exhaustion comes depoliticisation. Once depoliticisation
spreads to
both camps in a society with an atomised class formation and political
base,
the longer term potential for change and progress towards democracy is
seriously weakened. The future for these societies is truly dark.
The third point to be commented on concerns the inequality of citizens before the
law. The equality of citizens forms the legal basis of the modern
state. This
too is negated in Islamic societies where the interference of ideology
creates
several legal layers in society - for example, there are separate inheritance
laws for men and for women; for Muslims and for non-Muslims. Radical
Islam
creates citizens equal when it comes to
obeying laws but not when it comes to changing them. Man cannot reject
laws
that have been divinely ordained (and as they have been interpreted by
the
mujtahed - the
learned mullah).
In
power: the economy
Perhaps more than in any other
field, the rise to power of the pan-Islamist movement brings the
societies it
governs into conflict their own material infrastructure. If the main
role of
the state in all societies, including Islamic peripheral countries,
should be
to ‘recreate the external conditions for production’, the ‘Pan-Islamist
state’
in practice tends towards multi-dimensional and permanent economic
crisis. In particular, the ideological Islamic state cannot use to the
full the
various levers with which most states regulate the economy - the law, money and force.
To look at all three in turn. Ideology weakens the use of the law, one of the most important interventionist
tools in the hands of
the state. The law’s rational, objective elements become overshadowed
by
ideological and political considerations. As a result, the secular and
‘rational’ economic sphere constantly finds itself in opposition to
(essentially ideological and irrational) law, and slips out of the
latter’s
control.
Ideology limits and obstructs the
workings of the laws of capitalism too, including its
fundamental law of value. The
equality of a commodity in
exchange is eclipsed by its inequality in ideology: the law of value is
constrained or made conditional. Hand in hand with this limitation goes
a
certain liberalism. Ownership is valid so long as religious tax is paid
and it
has been obtained by ‘legitimate’ (mashrou’) means. An ideological
element thus
enters both into ownership and into the exchange of property. A
property used
for un-Islamic purposes (e.g., brewing) or for which religious tax
has not been paid is illegitimate and cannot be exchanged. Commerce is
also
affected by ideology (some commodities, such as alcohol,
‘immoral’ literature or films, videos, many articles of clothing, etc, cannot be bought or sold).
On the question of money.
This vital lever of state intervention in
the economy faces a similar fate. Money essentially loses its function
to
fulfil the needs of production and circulation. Instead, the religious-ideological state uses
money to answer its political and ideological
needs. The volume of money in circulation is allowed to expand at an
uncontrolled rate -
dictated by political considerations. Consequently the money supply is
no
longer a stabilising but an anarchic element in the economy. This
process
allows huge quantities of money to accumulate in a
few private
hands, creating equity that then confronts the state, vitiating its
control,
and even determining its actions. As in the case of the law, money is used to
offset the contradictions between the ideological
state and its material-economic base; and in the process comes to function as its own
antithesis - destabilising rather than stabilising the
economy.
As to the use of force,
its function in a Radical Islamic
government as a purely repressive tool is even more obvious in the
economic sphere than in others. Force is not deployed as it is in a
‘normal’
capitalist state - to
suppress the conflicts and contradictions between the various sectors
of the
economy, and to paper over cracks so that conditions for the
reproduction of
capital are optimized. Instead, it is used to suppress the
conflicts and contradictions between the economy as a whole and the
ruling
political power. The use of force, whether material or ideological - that is whether taking the form of
expropriation, legal suspension, fines, imprisonment, etc, or of denunciation
as diabolic and un-Islamic
from the pulpit – has one consequence: it creates
massive insecurity in the economic realm.
The result is the creation of a
complex web of non-economic structures, entwined with a parasitic and
unaccountable structure of capital. A powerful defensive perimeter is
then
built around this alliance protecting it against both the
ideological-material
coercion of the state and against blind economic forces. This huge
mafia-like structure has, at one extremity, the ‘bazaar’ and the
mosques, and, at the other, the armed forces and the religious courts. Such is the inevitable
fate of societies unfortunate enough to live
under a pan-Islamist regime.
There are further effects of
pan-Islamic rule on the economy, which go beyond its enfeebling the state and which
have even more
direct effects on the potential of these societies for economic
development. We need to look at investment, human resources, the labour
code,
and science and technology.
In these societies, both internal
and external capital fights shy of investment in long-term projects. Domestic investment is
discouraged by the fall in the rate of capital
accumulation. One factor in this is the expansion of an interfering,
totalitarian and highly expensive state. A huge burden is placed on the
gross
domestic product and value-adding activities, which hinders the
possibilities
of capital accumulation in line with developmental needs. The impact on the state sector is decisive and
disastrous.
The effect on the private
sector is less, but considerable, leading it essentially to shun investment in productive industries. It is affected
by the prevailing insecurity brought about by the ideological-political
policies we have discussed. Instead, capital is drawn into quick-return
transactions. It also tends towards less accountable
areas.
All this means that the private sector, prompted both by the most
efficient
pursuit of profit and by non-economic considerations, tends to eschew productive investment in
favour of playing the stock
market, hoarding, speculation, buying and selling, real estate and land
transactions, and so on.
Meanwhile, general economic
conditions mean that the ability of the state sector to invest in vital
parts
of the economy is also progressively eroded. Sectors of the economy dependent - because of low profitability or poor development - on state investment therefore also
fare badly. Increasing inequalities and imbalance is caused in an
economy
already suffering the uneven development of a peripheral capitalist
economy.
Foreign sources of investment are
even less likely to respond. In
addition to the
economic factors we have
discussed are political
factors, amongst them an
insecure legal-judicial atmosphere, and Radical Islam’s adventurist
foreign
policy. And
there is a further element: the deliberate
use of the economic weapon, including official sanctions, by core
capitalist
countries to control crisis-provoking Islamic governments acts as`a
barrier to
the entry of international finance into these countries. Where
investment does
take place, it is highly calculated and of a politico-economic nature.
Thus
On human resources: this most vital of all
factors in
economic development is also exhausted under Radical Islamic
governments. The
productivity of manpower under capitalism is intricately linked with
skill
levels, education, research, etc. A secular, scientific and
experimental environment encourages their development which in turn
serves to
refresh that environment. But the Islamic government crushes this
through the
pressure it brings to bear on secular life (including schools,
universities, scientific and research centres). The regime confronts
science
with belief (maktab). Its ceaseless interference in secular life even
forces
many of those who already have skills to flee the
country or to abandon productive economic activity. The Islamic state
thus not
only fails to recreate a qualitatively advanced workforce, but deskills
the
existing labour force, hampering the ability of the economy to expand.
Nor does
this environment attract foreign workers of sufficient calibre, who
also have
to cope with limitations on foreign exchange.
In Islam it is not the function of the state to
regulate labour through a labour code. The usual legal
framework
designed to deliver a labour force that is not unduly worn out is thus
absent. The
equal exchange of labour power is replaced by the law of ‘rental’ of
labour where the contract is between the individual and the owner
without
regulatory intervention. Where a labour code has been legislated, as in
Science and technology is an
essential ingredient of economic development, but, in radical Islam,
this too
succumbs to the blows of ideological control, especially at the
university and
technical college level. The return to the amalgamation of religion and
the
state prevents the flowering of science.
The potential for
domestic technological development is at best confined to selected
areas.
Foreign technology is also largely inaccessible for political and
foreign-exchange reasons. Moreover, the absence of a sufficiently
advanced
domestic technical skills-base limits the potential benefits of
imported
technology. So the result is to deny society one more key lever for
economic
development.
In short, Pan-Islamism in power is ruinous for the
economy. Though retaining
capitalism as the dominant mode of production, capitalist development
is slowed
down in certain fields without being able to resurrect some
pre-capitalist
forms of production. Thus the inherited multi-structured economy
(containing
elements of pre-capitalist economy in the midst of a dominant
capitalist
economy) is faced both with paralysing contradictions and internal
anarchy; and
with the existent unequal development of international capitalism, now
accentuated to breaking point. The peripheral economy, as
it comes under Islamic rule, cannot escape the additional disruption
involved
in its now-fractured relationship to the core countries - a relationship crucial for the external reproduction of capital that is so vital
for such an economy. The net
result is to push the economy into reverse; wear down the
superstructure and
infrastructure of the economy; dry up the economic resources and future
potential; and finally mortgage not only the present but also the prospects for a
recovery. Pan-Islamism in power creates the
conditions for the Islamic societies to sink in a sea of poverty and
destitution.
In
power: culture, social psychology
and
social atomization
In the sphere of social psychology,
all those elements in Radical Islam that, before achieves power, have
already
begun to transform the system of values, the intellectual structures,
and the
cultural face of society now come into their own. The two opposing
cultural
camps, each reacting to the other and rapidly moving towards the
extreme in
their positions, define themselves as the negation of the other. Each
camp - the Pan-Islamist
counterposed to those against Radical Islam,
the religious against the irreligious or even anti-religious - creates its own separate systems
based on
absolute values.
Anyone not a fervent believer in Radical Islam is a heathen
and a devil. Conversely, any Muslim is a
murderer, oppressor, plotter, etc. While one camp looks on the
exposure of a few strands of a woman’s hair as prostitution, the other
denounces any attempt at defining morals in private and sexual life as
fanaticism and backwardness. In practice, this process manifests itself
as a
strange whirlpool of false pretensions to religiosity,
institutionalised hypocrisy,
nihilism and immorality, pulling equally in opposite directions.
A further feature of this tragic
cultural transformation is the way it acquires a repressive police
function.
The culture of Radical Islam, in becoming the
official culture, is absorbed into the political structures of the
state.
Non-Islamist culture enters the realm of the forbidden as a
‘anti-culture’, a
‘cultural enemy’, a ‘cultural danger’ and ‘cultural corruption.’ It is
unceremoniously removed to the realm of the forbidden. Both cultural trends - the Pan-Islamic and its counterpoint - become completely subordinate to ideology in a
process that follows an almost inevitable
path towards an atomised
society.
The faster the official culture
takes shape, the more it is equipped with repressive tools. The greater
is the
absorption of ideological structures into the state, the greater is
their
control of cultural life. The more education becomes part of the ruling
religion, the faster the news media become schools of indoctrination,
entirely
lacking in diversity. In short, secular life comes under increasing ideological control
and greater
pressure. And the opposite is true
too. Social opposition,
reactions of discontent, criticism take the form of ‘cultural attack’
and
‘cultural confrontation.’ Culture becomes totally politicised.
In the absence of a political
opposition with any influence, popular protest is either explosive
(this is the
usual form it takes) or it manifests itself in an individual and
atomised
cultural form. There develops both an open and an underground war over
everyday-life issues. There are major conflicts in
which, using primitive weapons, opponents of the ruling culture mock
its many
manifestations - the
dress code, the ‘pagan’ national festivals that provoke street battles,
the
duality of home and public life and morality. Scratch the surface of a
Radical Islamic society and you will witness its
antithesis deeply permeating its every aspect. The irony is that Radical Islam, which
emerged as a movement for ‘cultural revolution’, finds itself surrounded by a ‘counter-cultural
revolution.’ History
mocks the very imams who are the epitome of absolute power by having
them
humiliated in running battles with rebellious ‘youth.’ The ruling
mullahs are
forced to admit that the cultural assault by the ‘enemy’ (read: the young who have known
nothing but the Islamic regime) is the
greatest danger they and the ‘Islamic revolution’ face.
Opposition atomised: the challenge for the left
But there is a danger signal here
for progressive forces too. This backward turn in the social struggle, from one which is
conscious, and organised on
political lines,
into an atomised,
individual, absolutist, cultural battle, without clear
class aims and lacking any real political consciousness, simultaneously wears
down the cultural potential of Islamic societies
and drains them of political health. The sad reality is that even when
the
religious-Islamist governments are overthrown, the future looks bleak.
What
progressive and stable socio-political system can take root in a
society mired
in uneven development, polarized and depoliticised, where public
discourse is
populist or demagogic? Social and moral indifference, negativism and
nihilism,
hypocrisy and pretensions to religiosity, rule.
Paternalism is in command and the dominant relationship in society is
that
between the follower and the followed, the disciple and the mujtahid
(religious
authority). Such societies have sunk into a lumpen, get-rich-at-all-costs
mentality, glorifying both money and violence,
aggressive towards the weak yet simultaneously characterized by
sycophancy and
opportunism.
How can a society which has fallen
victim to pan-Islamism throw off this massive dead weight of cultural
psychological trauma? What is to be done? Our purpose
here is to issue an invitation - for a dialogue over one of the most vexed
questions of our time. What are we to do about a blind and reactionary
revolt
of the downtrodden?
A child of our time and a product of
the ruinous effects of advanced capitalism in Islamic societies of the
periphery, Radical Islam confronts the left with its most difficult
challenge:
how to respond to a reactionary, grass-roots movement, arising out of
desperation - a movement which
destroys class, cultural and
even psycho-social potential, leaving society disarmed and ill-equipped
meaningfully to confront its own ruinous
state. The actual response of the
left has
not so far been edifying. Both in the region, and at a global
level, it is paralysed by a phenomenon that presents a
contradictory challenge to its instincts.
Here is a movement with claims to a
mythical past, but born ‘out of time’; a movement promising to lift
millions
into a just future based on that illusionary past. It is born into a present characterised by
increasing polarisation of wealth and
poverty, of development and backwardness, which consigns
millions to the rubbish heap in advanced capitalism’s backyard. At one
level the movement consists of the most
downtrodden in society,
crying out for their rightful share;
on another, it tramples
on those very structures and social formations with the potential for
progressive change. On the one hand, this movement
espouses anti-imperialist slogans, on the other, it destroys the class
which
can truly organise to overturn imperialist domination. It saves the
capitalist
mode of production from the onslaught of those who want to tear down
its
ramparts, but at the same time it disrupts capitalist accumulation and
provokes the wrath of global capital. It mobilises huge numbers around
the
slogans of ‘equality of the Islamic umma’ (community) and an end to
hunger, and
yet its policies drive society into ever greater unequal development,
poverty
and social polarisation. It calls for ‘independence’, and sacrifices
all
political freedoms. It calls for ‘freedom.’ and enslaves the female
half of the
population - not to mention
minorities and all those who
think differently. In the name of the right to cultural independence it
discards universal rights and justifies despotism, forcing a grey
uniformity on
millions. In the name of participatory democracy it makes millions
assent to
the increase of absolutist power over them - seemingly giving a willing ‘yea’ to
slavery. People are increasingly mobilised
and politicised only to end up being pulversied into individual units
expressing their opposition in a depoliticised culture of negativistic
rejection; and a movement that declared itself the anti-corruption
movement to
end all such movements itself
weaves corruption into
the very fabric of society.
There have been two basic
reactions to Radical Islam, the first a policy of political alliance;
the second one of confrontation, with the aim of bringing about its ultimate destruction. With the end of the Cold War, the first
response – from the point of view
of the left – has
faded. But at its height both left and right followed the hallowed
doctrine of
‘uniting against the common enemy.’ Radical Islam was
both anti-capitalist and it was anti-communist, so at no stage was it
short of potential allies – whether from the Soviet bloc with its blind ‘anti-imperialism’; or from the imperialist countries, with their virulent
anti-communism. On the left there were different attitudes to
the potential alliance. Believers in the ‘non-capitalist road to
socialism’,
for example, saw it as strategic and unconditional; for others it was
tactical,
dependent in the longer term on the attainment of proletarian hegemony
within
the revolution. But there were also perceived advantages in an alliance
for
capitalism, which was itself instrumental (directly and through client
states)
in bringing anti-communist Islam into being and encouraging its growth
as part
of its policy to contain the working-class movement. The
methodology of both left and right has been identical: you identify your opposite - anti-imperialism for some, anti-communism for others – and ally with its opposite. For the left, it is important to
recognize, however belatedly, that this method never had much to with
Marxism.
It was, rather, a product of Stalinist distortions - vulgarised
further in the light of the
revolutionary peasant movement in
After the Cold War
When the end of the Cold War took
one bloc out of the equation, both right and left turned to a policy of
confrontation. In general terms, two main trends can be discerned in
the way the surviving (capitalist) bloc, and its allies, faced Radical
Islam.
The first was to liquidate it ideologically; the second to combine pressure and
threats with appeasement and aid to force it on to a
path of ‘reform.’ Neither was new. Both had, for example, been
practised by the
builders of the modern state in Islamic countries earlier in the
century – by
Ataturk in Turkey, by Reza Shah in Iran, by Bourghiba in Tunisia, in
post-war
Syria, and even in Pakistan (ostensibly an ‘Islamic state’),
and so on. What is new
is the vigour with which, and the scale on which, these policies are
being
pursued today.
Modernisation and the formation of
the modern state in the countries listed above involved, above all, a process where social
institutions
and values had to be secularised; where rationalism replaced hadith
(actions or
sayings of the Prophet and the imams) and where laws that
can be changed replace immutable
divine law (sharia’a).
Those hoping to reform Radical Islam argue that pan-Islamism is a
cultural
movement, and a reaction to the formation of the modern state. These
states
overturned social structures too rapidly, provoking a
blind and angry reaction. As these people were unabsorbed in the
modern state their political reaction against that state has taken a
religious
form.
Those who argue thus remind the
proponents of the policy of the whip that belief cannot be suppressed
through
repression. The answer, accordingly, is to put a brake on change, and
introduce
certain reforms favouring religion, while retaining the overall
framework of
the modern state. The ploy is to change the ruling bloc in such a way
as to
broaden the social base of the regime. An alliance is sought with one
section
of religion against another. The resulting political stability is
thought to
weaken the appeal of Radical Islam, and marginalising it in the
political
equation. It is vital, however, to keep the new Islamic allies away
from the
key centres of power (the army, the security apparatus, etc.). Examples where
such policies have been put into practice are
A variant of this policy is proposed for those countries where
neither the prospects of a
coalition government exist, nor is the secular state viable.
This is to abandon the quest for
modernisation and leave
the task of amalgamating the national capital with global capital - that is the task of reconciling the
capitalist infrastructure with aspects of religious culture - in the hands of reformist Islam.
The aim is to stabilise the political structure of society while
avoiding the
dangers of outright modernisation. Unlike the first proposition, which
holds
that the rigidity of sharia’a cannot cope with the changing needs of a
modern
state, this one believes that religion and capitalism can be
reconciled. The
argument between these two interpretations is ongoing.
The two views share a
common core. They rely on Islamic
reformists to secure the interests of the West - in the one argument as a junior
partner to secularists; in the other, in their own right. The task of making the
political and economic
structures of capitalism compatible with indigenous culture (in a country of the
periphery)
is,
in both cases, given over to
reformist Islam – though it is understood that some outside pressure must
be brought to
bear on religious thought to force it to seek accommodation with
secularism and
take the road to transformation. Needless to say neither policy ever operates in its pure
form. Specific conditions impose some degree of compromise between the different roads (in
Wrong analysis, doomed policies
Such policies are all likely to fail, in
the main because
they do not address the root cause of Radical Islam. The movement is
not a
reaction against the modern state. It is a product of the effects of
the modern
state in a peripheral country in globalised,
late capitalism.
The reformers who see the pan-Islamist
movement as a cultural phenomenon, a reaction to the formation of the
modern
state and the over-hasty destruction of traditional
structures,
are on slippery ground. They
mistake cause for effect and cannot explain why this ‘reaction’
occurred in the
1980s - in
some of the countries
involved over half a
century after the modern state was established. Nor can they understand
the
explosion taking place today, when, thirty years ago, Radical Islam was
effortlessly crushed by Nasserism.
Our argument is that Radical Islam
is a reaction to the effects of particular
forms of modernisation,
not to modernisation per se. This is not a trivial difference. For one
thing, understanding it profoundly affects the strategies needed
(and discussed below) to overcome political
Islam. The idea that its successes simply
represent
a social reaction to
secularisation ignores the fact that virtually all these
societies are multi-cultural formations, in
which advanced
capitalism exists precariously alongside pre-capitalist and even tribal structures. Sizeable
sections of society are not at all
averse to modernisation.
Theories dependent on the idea that Islamic
countries are simply backward ignore this complex cultural reality. Moreover, examples of the failure of the policy of
accommodation abound. Appeasement has not diminished the spectre of
Radical
Islam in
The Iranian left
According to sections of the Iranian
left, faithful to a highly formalistic, deeply rooted
economism and a crude statism, any government that increased state ownership at home, and sided with the so-called
‘socialist bloc’ abroad, was a natural ally of
the world proletariat, regardless of the degree
of participatory democracy it
permitted or the
relations of production it
established. State ownership was even identified as the criterion for ‘socialist’ transformation.
An alternative view, more
recently in vogue, rightly rejects such statist economism, but only to
replace it by another one-sided view, this time immersed in a cultural interpretation. Culture
and ideology are considered the essential elements of Radical Islam,
and also
the route to its negation. One such interpretation combs the past in search of anti-orthodox-religious
elements in national culture. One favoured source is Islamic mysticism, but there are also pre-Islamic
movements, such as Manichaeism and
Mazdakism. Egalitarian and
humanistic elements in mysticism are brought in to confront official organised religion,
and to create an alternative to it.
In contrast, there are those who declare that there is
nothing in national culture on
which to build. This argument,
made by many prominent
thinkers of the ‘new left’, claims that democracy will never take root in
These are both intellectual
movements seeing culture as central and defining
the task
as the creation of a new one. The latter group claims to follow
Heidegger – but they are not particularly faithful
to him, since
they propose to build a new culture from
scratch, rejecting all existing
culture. The effect of such a strategy
is to separate the intellectual completely from society. And, despite
their claim to articulate a radical left solution, they echo the
liberal cry that it is not possible to have democracy,
or take steps towards socialism, in societies on the periphery of world
capitalism, especially in countries where a tradition based on religion
exists.
The
international Left
Interestingly the positions taken by
the left outside
We have argued, then, that Radical Islam is of our
time – a child born not ‘out of time’ but
rather out of today’s
profound economic,
political and ideological crisis. In relation to this, the ‘cultural’ crisis is not so much a
cause as a blindly reactionary effect. Radical Islam is not a response to
the modern state, modern culture or the separation of the religion and
state, but rather to mass
unemployment, destitution
and hopelessness brought about by the modern state. It is not so much a
reaction to the essence of modernism but to the
ravages of advanced capitalism in a part of its periphery.
Those thrown on to the
rubbish heap of history claw at the nearest available
ideology at a time when liberalism,
nationalism
and known forms of socialism are all sinking in a
quagmire. The past
rules the present in those
societies not because of its robustness, but more because of the
feebleness of
the alternatives.
It is, therefore, futile to imagine that any project
that does not offer a fundamental
solution to the political and economic crisis can forestall the genesis
and
growth of such blind and ultimately destructive movements. It is also
clear
that any political solution must be accompanied by a cultural
renaissance
congenial to human feeling, intellect and thought. This requires nothing less than a full-scale ideological spring-cleaning for the left. The three major planks on which the left
must confront the pan-Islamist movement are:
first, the formulation of an independent and radical economic programme;
second the development of a coherent political
platform; and third, a
thorough
overhaul of its own system of beliefs and ideas
about organisation.
A radical economic alternative to neo-liberalism
Where advanced capitalism is
polarising
the world into extremes of affluence and poverty that now
transcend geographical boundaries,
one cannot talk of an
independent economic programme that does not challenge neo-liberalism at every level. This means
confronting the so-called structural
adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, which
are bringing about the destitution of millions in the North as
well as in the
South. It is on this ground that the left must distinguish
itself from the liberals who also seek to woo the masses breaking away from
Radical Islam. In
the South this means a number of things.
First, key sections of the
economy need to be in public
control, which is not necessarily the same as state
control. It has to be promoted as
the most suitable form within which the labour
force can be directly
involved in production, with a major input into meaningful decision-making. Second, the producers must control the means of
production not just in legal terms (such as an article in the constitution) but in real political and practical
terms. Third, the right balance must be created between central planning (without
which it would be impossible to overcome the inequalities) and
decentralised
workers control. Fourth, the system of social security must
improve the quality of life – something that cannot be
achieved without the
working population controlling state expenditure, in particular with regard to welfare,
subsidies and wages.
These, and other
similar,
economic policies are
crucial if the left is to unite
with, and mobilize its main
social base – the
downtrodden. Only with a radical programme addressing the root cause of mass destitution, confronting the core-periphery contradictions, and showing how to overcome
uneven development, can the left attract its
natural class allies away from the clutches of Islamic obscurantism.
Clearing
out ideological baggage on the left: alliances and
cultural heritage
As we argued in part one of this essay, the Islamic movement filled a vacuum created by
the ideological feebleness of
the two main social classes – the native bourgeoisie and the
young working class. But we
must also confront the fact that the
left, as it exists in these countries today, is singularly ill equipped to lead the
implementation of the programme
outlined above. A major rethink is necessary if the left is to fill this
ideological vacuum before those
who would promote bourgeois
alternatives have produced new
prescriptions with their already sharpened pens. Without such a rethink the
left can entertain no hope of truly representing the interests of workers, organising working-class struggles, and becoming
integral to a genuinely mass force
in those societies. Two aspects of this need particularly urgent
reappraisal, the first relating to alliances, the second
to the cultural inheritance of the
left.
It is time the left returned to a class-based analysis of
historical development, too often
ignored in the recent past. It must
make all alliances with political forces and organisations
conditional on the true class interest of the working class it claims
to
represent. For too long it has made the most incredible contortions to
justify its support and
alliance with a variety of unsavoury groups. A crude anti-imperialism,
devoid
of any class analysis, fed at times by the totally discredited theories
of ‘non
capitalist road to socialism’ have underlined these
justifications. The support given to
the Islamic Republic (a regime which systematically and brutally destroyed all the working-class and democratic
organisations
and structures that grew out of an anti-capitalist revolution)
was, in some
places, given out of sheer pragmatism or even opportunism; in others, from a genuine but misguided
anti-imperialism.
The left has to wake up to the fact
that in the interface between the ravages of advanced capitalism in the
South
(and also the North) and the weakness of the working-class alternatives
(organisationally and ideologically) a whole series
of movements and insurrections will arise with ‘radical’ and even
‘anti-capitalist’ content. The left of today and tomorrow faces movements, often
from below, fuelled by desperation, and
containing a bewildering intermix
of progressive and
reactionary elements. To steer a course of solidarity and alliance in
this
morass requires a clear vision of the
left’s future,
based on a clear understanding of
where the interests of
the working class lie. The experience of the Iranian
revolution, and of other major twentieth-century revolutions, clearly points to the fact that all alliances and solidarity
must be subordinated to
one consideration only: does the policy serve
the true interests of the working class?
Without a thorough reappraisal
of its cultural and intellectual
heritage the
left will remain
marginalised in the huge battles ahead.
The ideological vacuum will be filled by various bourgeois
alternatives:
liberal here, totalitarian and fascistic there. The left, on both sides of the North/South
divide has a long way to go.
Meanwhile, the cultural and human ravages of advanced capitalism will continue to be met by
the opposite but equally appalling ravages wrought in the
name of false utopias, generated from the turbulent depths of the despair of the ‘wretched of the
earth.’